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miklos.konczol@jak.ppke.hu			 The	paper	first	seeks	to	reconstruct,	on	the	basis	of	Aristotle’s	explanation	and	example	in	the	Rhetoric	(1374a	26–b	1),	how	the	 shortcomings	 of	 a	 legal	 text,	 resulting	 from	 an	 omission	made	 by	 the	 legislator,	 can	 be	 plausibly	 argued	 to	 provide	sufficient	 ground	 for	 not	 applying	 the	 rule	 contained	 by	 the	text.	 Second,	 it	 argues	 that	 the	 topics	 of	 fairness	 listed	 by	Aristotle	 (1374b	 2–22)	 cannot	 be	 used	 to	 reconstruct	Aristotle’s	 views	 on	 the	 functioning	 of	 epieikeia	 in	 judicial	decision-making.		 KEYWORDS:	 Aristotle,	 definition,	 Epieikeia,	 fairness,	 justice,	legislator’s	intent,	Rhetoric			1.	INTRODUCTION		In	Aristotle’s	Rhetoric,	Book	I,	Chapter	10,	a	general	classification	of	just	and	unjust	deeds	(1373b	1–6)	 is	 intended	to	serve	as	an	outline	of	the	possible	topics	of	arguments	useful	in	judicial	speeches,	where	the	goal	(telos)	of	rhetoric	is	persuasion	about	lawfulness.	Some	of	these	deeds,	Aristotle	 states	 (1374a	20–26),	 are	 just	 or	 unjust	 (lawful	 or	 unlawful)	according	 to	 unwritten	 laws,	 and	 these	 can	 be	 divided	 in	 two	 groups:	those	resulting	 from	a	high	 level	of	virtue	or	vice,	which	are	regulated	by	 social	 norms	 other	 than	written	 law	 (cf.	 Harris,	 2013a,	 p.	 30),	 and	those	 related	 to	 some	 shortcoming	 (elleimma)	 of	 a	 particular	 written	law.	 In	the	second	case,	however,	 it	should	be	regulated	by	the	written	law	of	 a	 specific	political	 community,	but	 the	 respective	 law	somehow	fails	 to	 provide	 the	 adequate	 rules.	 Fairness	 (to	 epieikes)	 is	 a	 kind	 of	justice	 applicable	 to	 the	 latter	 kind	 of	 situation:	 it	 is	 justice	 beyond	written	law	(to	para	ton	gegrammenon	nomon	dikaion,	1374a	27–28).	The	 interpretation	 of	 Aristotelian	 fairness	 has	 always	 been	 a	favourite	topic	of	legal	philosophers	and	legal	historians	alike.	For	both	groups,	 it	 is	 important	 as	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 strict	 application	 of	 the	
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321	comprises	what	is	epieikes	(1137b	8–11).	The	reason	for	the	ambiguity	is	that	while	laws	aim	at	justice	by	their	nature	(see	1129b	14–24),	they	may	 still	 lead	 to	 unjust	 decisions	 in	 individual	 cases	 and	 may	 need	rectification	through	epieikeia:		The	cause	of	this	is	that	all	law	is	universal,	and	yet	there	are	some	 things	about	which	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	make	universal	pronouncements.	 So	 in	 the	 sorts	 of	 cases	 in	 which	 it	necessarily	 pronounces	 universally,	 but	 cannot	 do	 so	 and	achieve	correctness,	law	chooses	what	holds	for	the	most	part,	in	full	knowledge	of	the	error	it	is	making.	(1137b	13–16)			It	 is	 in	 those	cases,	 i.e.	where	a	general	rule	 fails	 to	 take	 the	particular	circumstances	of	a	given	case	into	account,	that	fairness	can	play	a	role	in	the	application	of	law:		 [O]n	 these	occasions	 it	 is	correct,	where	 there	 is	an	omission	by	 the	 lawgiver,	 and	 he	 has	 gone	wrong	 by	 having	made	 an	unqualified	 pronouncement,	 to	 rectify	 the	 deficiency	 by	reference	 to	what	 the	 lawgiver	himself	would	have	said	 if	he	had	 been	 there	 and,	 if	 he	 had	 known	 about	 the	 case,	 would	have	laid	down	in	law.	(1137b	21–24)		Aristotle	 emphasises	 that	 such	 cases	 do	 not	 result	 from	 intellectual	errors	 made	 by	 the	 legislator,	 nor	 do	 they	 indicate	 the	 technical	deficiency	 of	 a	 piece	 of	 legislation.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 inevitable	consequences	of	the	tension	between	the	universality	of	the	law	and	the	singularity	of	human	actions	(see	1137b	17–19).2	A	related,	and	equally	important,	point	he	makes	is	that	 ‘rectification’	does	not	mean	denying	the	 validity	 of	 the	 law,	 but	 has	 to	 be	 made	 with	 reference	 to	 the	legislator’s	intention.	Thus,	 although	 Aristotle	 is	 aware	 that	 legislation	 may	 contain	errors	(see	1129b	24–25),	epieikeia	 is	not	meant	to	correct	that	sort	of	deficiency	by	amending	the	law.3	Its	purpose	is	to	bring	about	justice	in	the	 individual	 case,	 thus	 fulfilling	 the	actual	 intention	of	 the	 legislator.																																									 																					2	 He	 also	 adds	 that	 there	 is	 another	means	 of	 regulation,	 the	 decrees,	 which	allow	for	a	greater	flexibility	on	the	part	of	the	legislator.	As	decrees	are	made	for	 individual	 cases	 rather	 than	 generalised	 types	 of	 behaviour,	 they	 do	 not	have	to	provide	rules	for	an	infinite	number	of	cases.	See	1137b	27–32.	3	 Pace	 Hurri	 (2013,	 p.	 154).	 Cf.	 also	 Saunders	 (2001,	 p.	 80;	 ibid.	 n.	 29),	mentioning	 the	 possibility	 of	 “a	 piecemeal	 modification”,	 with	 reference	 to	Brunschwig	 (1980,	 pp.	 525–526).	 See	 further	Mirhady	 (1990,	 p.	 395)	 on	 the	judges	acting	as	legislators.	
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323	questions	as	well.	Concerning	penalties,	for	example,	the	Athenian	says	that	 	the	 judge	must	 assist	 the	 lawgiver	 in	 carrying	 out	 this	 same	task,	whenever	the	law	entrusts	to	him	the	assessment	of	what	the	 defendant	 is	 to	 suffer	 or	 pay,	 while	 the	 lawgiver,	 like	 a	draughtsman,	 must	 give	 a	 sketch	 in	 outline	 of	 cases	 which	illustrate	the	rules	of	the	written	code.	(934b	6–c	2)	5		The	 sketch	 that	 follows	 is,	 however,	 a	 fairly	 detailed	 one:	 Plato	apparently	 seeks	 to	 eliminate	 from	Magnesian	 legislation	much	 of	 the	ambiguity	 present	 in	 its	 Athenian	 counterpart	 (see	 Harris,	 2013b,	 pp.	205–209).6	But	 can	 judges	 in	Magnesia	 go	 beyond	written	 law	 in	 order	 to	reach	 a	 more	 just	 verdict?	 It	 seems	 that	 there	 is	 at	 least	 one	 type	 of	affairs	where	they	can.	One	of	the	Magnesian	laws	provides	that	in	case	a	 father	 dies	 having	 a	 daughter	 but	 no	 (natural	 or	 adopted)	 son,	 the	male	 relative	who	 comes	 next	 in	 the	 order	 defined	 by	 the	 law	 has	 to	marry	 the	 daughter	 (924e	 3–925a	 2).	 The	 legislator,	 however,	 has	 to	take	into	account	the	possibility	that	the	prospective	heir	cannot	marry	the	 daughter	 because	 of	 her	 physical	 or	 mental	 illness	 (925d	 5–e	 5,	926b	2–6).	Such	cases	have	to	be	adjudicated	by	a	panel	of	arbitrators	(diaitētai)	who	are	allowed	to	grant	exemption	from	the	legal	obligation	(926a	6–7,	b	7–d	2).	Arguably,	this	is	a	case	of	epieikeia,	albeit	Plato	does	not	use	the	term	for	it.7	We	see	the	tension	between	the	law	formulated	in	universal	terms	 and	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 individual	 case	 (925d	 8–e	 2);	 the	preamble	 to	 the	 law	 asks	 for	 understanding	 (syngnōmē)	 on	 behalf	 of	both	the	legislator	(for	his	inability	to	consider	individual	cases)	and	the	persons	asking	for	exemption	(for	their	 inability	to	obey	the	command	of	the	law)	(925e	6–926	a	3);	and	in	the	procedure	reference	has	to	be	made	to	the	legislator’s	intent	(926c	2–4).	This	makes	clear	that	fairness	is	not	directed	against	the	validity	of	the	law	and	that	it	actually	serves																																									 																					5	Translated	by	Saunders	(1970).	6	Cf.	also	the	remark	made	by	Saunders	(2001,	p.	87):	“Not	only	will	the	gaps	be	fewer,	 but	 the	 actual	 laws	 will	 be	 far	 less	 open-ended	 conceptually;	 for	 the	Magnesian	 citizen	 is	 conditioned	 not	 merely	 by	 an	 intensive	 educational	process	but	by	the	frequent	legal	preambles:	he	will	have	fairly	firm	ideas	about	what	(say)	justice,	virtue,	heresy,	good	and	bad	artistic	standards,	really	are”.	7	 See	 Saunders	 (2001,	 pp.	 84–86),	 with	 some	 qualifications	 based	 on	 certain	differences	between	the	typical	form	of	epieikeia	and	Plato’s	description	of	the	situation.	
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325	enumerate	 the	possibilities.	 If,	 then,	 the	action	 is	undefinable	when	a	law	must	be	framed,	it	is	necessary	to	speak	in	general	terms,	 so	 that	 if	 someone	wearing	a	 ring	 raises	his	hand	and	strikes,	 by	 the	 written	 law	 he	 is	 violating	 the	 law	 and	 does	wrong,	 when	 in	 truth	 he	 has	 not	 done	 any	 harm	 and	 this	(judgement)	is	fair.	(1374a	31–b	1)9		 In	the	introductory	chapter	of	the	Rhetoric,	Aristotle	has	already	pointed	 out	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 legislator’s	 competence	 in	 terms	 of	questions	 of	 fact	 (1354b	 11–16).	 Here,	 however,	 he	 goes	 one	 step	further,	asserting	that	even	if	the	legislator	has	got	a	definite	intent	(in	the	example	it	may	be	that	people	should	refrain	from	assaulting	others	with	weapons	made	of	iron),	its	formulation	as	it	appears	in	the	written	text	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 imperfect.	 Therefore,	 the	 argument	 can	 be	 made	before	the	court	that	in	addition	to	applying	the	rule	previously	given	to	the	 particular	 facts	 of	 the	 case,	 the	 judges	 also	 have	 to	 establish	what	provisions	 the	 text	 of	 the	 law	 actually	 contains.	 The	 result	 of	 their	examination	of	the	rule	may	contradict	what	is	generally	understood	to	be	 the	 ‘ordinary	meaning’	 of	 the	 text.	 Of	 course,	 the	 speaker	 need	not	highlight	that	this	is	what	happens	in	the	court:	rather,	he	may	propose	a	reading	of	 the	 text	as	 the	one	 that	genuinely	reflects	 the	 intention	of	the	legislator.	Arguments	from	the	legislator’s	intent	have	a	twofold	character.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	 exemplify	 what	 are	 often	 termed	 ‘teleological’	arguments.10	As	Jacques	Brunschwig	puts	it	in	his	interpretation,		 there	exists	a	perfectly	applicable	law,	but	[…]	a	mechanical	or	blind	 application	 of	 it	 would	 be	 too	 severe	 according	 to	 the	moral	intuitions	of	the	judge	and	those	of	the	society	in	which	he	works.	(Brunschwig,	1996,	p.	139,	following	Shiner,	1987)		Consequently,	the	argument	is	based	on	the	assertion	that	the	legislator	would	not	have	intended	the	law	to	lead	to	such	a	verdict.	On	the	other	hand,	the	legislator’s	intent	is	still	something	referred	to	in	“rule-based	reasoning”,	 where	 it	 appears	 as	 a	 means	 of	 interpretation,	 which	 is	intended	 to	 help	 establish	 the	 meaning	 of	 a	 normative	 text,	 by	explaining	 how	 the	 legislator	 actually	 meant	 what	 he	 put	 into	 words.	What	is	important	for	us	to	see	here	is	that	this	method	of	reasoning,	i.e.																																									 																					9	Quotations	from	the	Rhetoric	follow	the	revised	text	of	Kennedy’s	translation	(Kennedy,	2007),	with	occasional	modifications.	10	 The	 consequentialist	 nature	 of	 teleological	 interpretation	 is	 highlighted	 by	Cserne	(2011,	p.	38).	
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327	action	qualifies	as	“wounding”.	In	such	a	case,	applying	the	sanctions	of	wounding	would	 lead	 to	 injustice,	 as	 it	would	mean	 treating	 different	actions	(e.g.	deliberately	using	a	sword	and	wearing	a	ring)	in	the	same	way.	 This	 is,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics,	 an	 error	 that	results	from	the	lacking	qualification	(cf.	1137b	22).	In	 such	 a	 case,	 the	 defendant	 can	 suggest	 that	 further	qualification	has	to	be	added	by	the	 judges,	saying	“what	the	 legislator	would	 have	 included.”	 For	 example,	 further	 details	 concerning	 the	characteristics	of	 the	object	made	of	 iron	can	be	described,	 in	order	 to	make	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 ring	 and	 a	 weapon	 appear	 in	 the	judgement.	Or	the	intention	of	the	person	“raising	his	hand	or	striking”	can	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration,	 in	 order	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	deliberate	use	of	a	weapon	and	wearing	a	ring	on	one’s	hand—“looking	not	to	the	action	but	to	the	deliberate	purpose,”	as	Aristotle	puts	it	later	(1374b	13–14).	These	qualifications	would	then	concern	the	concept	of	‘wounding’	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 law.	 The	 defendant	would	 argue	 that	 he	“raised	his	hand”	or	“stroke”	but	did	not	“wound,”	denying	not	the	fact	itself	but	its	legal	qualification.	This	way	of	reasoning	would	then	be	strikingly	similar	to	what	is	described	 in	 Chapter	 13	 in	 the	 paragraphs	 immediately	 preceding	 the	discussion	 of	 fairness.	 Arguments	 from	 fairness	 as	 well	 as	 those	concerning	 the	 epigramma	 focus	 on	 the	moment	 of	 decision,	which	 is	essentially	 about	 the	 correspondence	between	 the	description	of	what	happened	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	abstract	case	contained	by	the	legal	rule	 on	 the	 other.12	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 question	 in	 both	 cases	 is	 if	 a	certain	 rule	 is	 relevant	 for	 a	 certain	 human	 action.	 Looking	 for	 the	difference	 between	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 argument,	 we	 find	 Aristotle	referring	to	epigramma	as	“what	the	laws	regulate”	(1374a	19–20)	and	to	epieikeia	as	related	to	unwritten	law	(20–26).	Thus,	in	the	case	of	the	former	 the	 speaker	 concentrates	 on	 how	 the	 individual	 action	 can	 be	best	described	with	 the	 legal	 terms	given	 in	 the	 law.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	latter,	 in	 turn,	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 how	 the	 legal	 provision	 should	 be	(re)formulated	 to	 express	 the	 legislator’s	 (presumable)	 intention.	 In	light	of	that,	Aristotle’s	advice	about	having	definitions	at	hand	(1374a	6–9)	may	equally	refer	to	those	arguing	from	fairness.		5.	TOPICS	OF	FAIRNESS		Interpreters	 rightly	 note	 that	 Aristotle’s	 discussions	 of	 epieikeia	comprise	two	different	perspectives:	one	that	focuses	on	the	corrective																																									 																					12	 Cf.	 the	 distinction	 between	 Sachverhalt	 and	 (gesetzlicher)	 Tatbestand	 in	German	legal	doctrine	(Rechtsdogmatik),	see	e.g.	Larenz	(1969,	pp.	230–233).	
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328	function	 of	 epieikeia	 and	 one	 looking	 at	 epieikeia	 as	 a	 virtue	 (see	 e.g.	Rapp,	2002,	p.	503).	This	distinction	is	very	important	because	it	is	only	by	 keeping	 these	 perspectives	 separate	 that	 one	 can	 account	 for	 the	difference	between	the	theoretical	reconstruction	of	epieikeia	at	1374a	26–1374b	1	and	the	list	of	related	topics	at	1374b	2–22.	While	it	is	not	very	difficult	 to	 see	how	epieikeia	 as	 a	way	of	 statutory	 interpretation	can	 help	 the	 speaker	 persuade	 the	 judges	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 to	contribute	 to	 a	 just	 decision	 on	 the	 other,	 the	 topics	 of	 fairness,	 or	 at	least	some	of	them,	seem	much	more	puzzling.	The	 sentence	 that	 introduces	 the	 list	 of	 topics	 (1374b	 2–3)	 by	establishing	 a	 link	with	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 of	 to	 epieikes	 makes	clear,	at	any	rate,	 that	 the	 following	 list	 shows	characteristic	examples	of	fair	and	unfair	actions	and	persons.		
5.1	Understanding		The	 actual	 list	 of	 examples	 begins	 with	 having	 understanding	(syngnōmē).13	Syngnōmē	 appears	 in	Book	VI	of	 the	Nicomachean	Ethics	as	a	capacity	related	to	deciding	about	what	is	epieikes	(1143a	19–24).	While	 it	 is	 sometimes	 interpreted	 as	 some	 kind	 of	 an	 extra-legal	consideration	based	on	empathy	alone	(see,	however,	Grimaldi,	1980,	p.	302),	 in	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics	 Aristotle	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 it	 is	directed	at	truth,	which	is	also	emphasised	at	the	end	of	the	example	in	the	 Rhetoric,	 where	 to	 alēthes	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	 gegrammenos	 nomos	(1374a	 36–b	 1).	 The	 framing14	 of	 the	 following	 distinctions	 between	errors	 (hamartēmata)	 and	 wrongs	 (adikēmata),	 and	 errors	 and																																									 																					13	The	opening	phrase	of	the	list,	eph’	hois	te	gar	dei	syngnōmēn	echein,	epieikē	
tauta,	 raises	problems	 in	 terms	of	 rendering	 as	well.	Kennedy	 (2007,	 p.	 100)	takes	tauta	to	refer	to	eph’	hois,	and	hois	to	be	the	indirect	subject	of	syngnōmēn	
echein,	 which	 results	 in	 the	 translation	 “those	 actions	 that	 [another	 person]	should	 pardon	 are	 fair.”	 The	 reason	why	 one	 should	 pardon	 anything	 that	 is	




329	misfortune	 (atychēmata),	 respectively,	 suggests	 that	 making	 such	distinctions	belongs	to	the	domain	of	syngnōmē.	Aristotle	gives	exact	criteria	 for	each	of	 the	 three	cases	(1374b	6–10).	Misfortune,	he	says,	cannot	be	anticipated	by	reason	(paraloga)	and	 is	 not	 caused	 by	 an	 evil	 moral	 disposition	 (mē	 apo	 mochthērias).	Errors,	 in	turn,	can	be	anticipated	(mē	paraloga)	but	do	not	stem	from	moral	badness	either	(mē	apo	ponērias).	It	is	only	wrongdoing	that	can	be	anticipated	by	reason	and	result	from	an	evil	moral	disposition,	from	which	 wrongs	 committed	 because	 of	 desire	 (di’	 epithymian)	 are	 no	exception.	Apparently,	 then,	 it	 is	 only	 the	 wrongs	 that	 deserve	 the	 full	rigour	 of	 the	 law,	while	 errors	 and	misfortune	 call	 for	 a	more	 lenient	treatment.	While	Aristotle	gives	no	examples	here,	his	 criteria	make	 it	quite	clear	what	cases	belong	to	each	of	 these	categories.	Wrongdoing,	which	has	been	defined	at	the	beginning	of	Chapter	10	(1368b	6–7	and	9–10),	is	the	case	the	legislator	has	in	mind	when	drafting	a	law	about	a	certain	crime.	Compared	to	that,	an	adequate	adjudication	of	errors	and	misfortune	may	 require	 some	 additions	 to	 the	 legal	 definition	 of	 the	crime,	just	as	described	under	the	heading	of	fairness.	In	the	case	of	misfortune,	 the	wrongful	 intention	on	the	part	of	the	 person	 committing	 the	 crime	 is	 missing	 altogether.	 The	paradigmatic	case	of	that	is	the	harm	caused	by	a	natural	disaster,	as	e.g.	in	the	case	of	a	storm	that	prevents	a	ship	from	reaching	a	port.15	Errors,	on	the	other	hand,	belong	to	the	actions	done	“willingly”	(hekōn),	i.e.	“knowingly	and	unforced”	(cf.	1368b	9–11).	These	cases	are	usually	regarded	as	the	class	of	human	actions	covered	by	“negligence”	in	 modern	 Western	 legal	 terminology	 (see	 Hamburger,	 1971,	 p.	 102;	Harris,	2013a,	p.	32).		
5.2	Letter	and	intent		The	next	topics	of	epieikeia	oppose	the	letter	of	the	law	and	the	intent	of	the	legislator	(1374b	11–13).	As	opposed	to	syngnōmē,	where	the	focus	was	 on	 the	 perpetrator’s	 attitude,	 these	 topics	 focus	 on	 the	 desirable	way	of	statutory	interpretation	(cf.	Harris,	2013a,	p.	32).	Looking	at	the	legislator’s	 intent	 is,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 essential	 for	 building	 up	 an	argument	 from	 fairness,	 at	 least	 if	 one	 wants	 to	 avoid	 making	 the	impression	of	urging	a	decision	contra	legem.		




5.3	Intention		After	 the	opposition	of	 letter	 and	 intent,	 further	 topics	 concerning	 the	perpetrator	 follow.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 regards	 deliberate	 choice	(prohairesis)	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 action	 itself	 (1374b	 13–14),	 thus	continuing	 the	 considerations	 related	 to	 syngnōmē.	On	 the	other	hand,	this	 topic	 seems	 to	 respond	 to	 that	 of	 definition,	where	 Aristotle	 says	that	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 an	 action	 qualifies	 as	 a	 certain	 crime	should	be	decided	on	the	basis	of	prohairesis	 (1374a	11–13).	A	further	link	 is	 to	 Chapters	 10–12,	 where	 the	 probabilities	 are	 related	 to	intention	rather	than	an	action	being	actually	committed.		
5.4	Part	and	whole		The	next	two	topics	oppose	the	part	and	the	whole,	first	in	the	abstract,	then	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 perpetrator’s	 behaviour.	 The	 former	 is,	 in	 itself,	sufficiently	general	to	be	regarded	as	another	formulation	of	the	essence	of	epieikeia,	i.e.	the	requirement	of	achieving	a	decision	that	is	adequate	to	 the	 individual	 case.	 The	 second	 one,	 however,	 may	 seem	 more	problematic,	 as	 it	 seems	 to	 call	 for	 a	 decision	 based	 on	 past	 events	rather	than	on	the	action	under	dispute.16	While	this	possibility	cannot	be	excluded,	there	are	other	possible	explanations	which	come	closer	to	what	seems	to	be	the	basic	principle	of	epieikeia.	First,	past	events	may	be	considered,	if	not	for	deciding	about	the	lawfulness	of	an	action,	then	for	imposing	a	penalty.17	Such	a	reading	would	also	highlight	a	possible	Platonic	 influence.18	 Second,	 the	 general	 behaviour	 of	 the	 defendant	may	be	used	as	indirect	proof	for	his	moral	character	and,	consequently,	his	prohairesis	in	the	specific	case	(cf.	Saunders,	1991,	p.	113;	Johnstone,	1999,	 pp.	 95–97;	 Lanni,	 2006,	 60–61).	 Third,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 that	




331	these	 topics	 are	 not	 only	 meant	 to	 be	 used	 in	 connection	 with	 the	judges’	decision	but	also	for	displaying	fairness	within	a	speech.19		
5.5	Memories		There	 are	 two	 further	 topics	 that	 concentrate	 explicitly	 on	 past	 deeds	(1374b	 16–18).	 The	 first	 one	 opposes	 good	 things	 to	 bad	 things	experienced	by	the	same	person,	and	the	second	one	good	things	done	by	 someone	 to	 good	 things	 done	 to	 the	 same	person.	Here	 again,	 it	 is	hard	 to	 see	 how	 these	 could	 contribute	 to	 persuasion	 concerning	 the	lawfulness	of	a	specific	action.	Moreover,	unlike	 in	the	previous	topics,	the	opposition	is	not	between	one’s	general	character	and	an	individual	action	 but	 between	 (perhaps	 several)	 particular	 actions,	 and	 the	emphasis	 is	 not	 on	 the	 actions	 themselves	 but	 on	 the	 act	 of	
mnēmoneuein.	Therefore,	the	second	option	of	interpretation	mentioned	above	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 topics	 of	 “part	 and	 whole”	 is	 out	 of	question.	 It	 seems	more	 likely	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	 judges	who	 remember	something	but	someone	of	the	other	participants	of	the	legal	procedure,	and	 that	 mnēmoneuein	 is	 used	 here	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 mentioning	something.		
5.6	Attitudes	to	wrongdoing	and	litigation		In	the	case	of	the	last	three	topics	(1374b	18–22)	there	is	no	doubt	that	they	 do	 not	 regard	 the	 judges’	 attitudes	 but	 those	 of	 the	 litigants	 (or	someone	who	is	not	directly	involved	in	the	case	but	is	characterised	in	the	speech).	They	say	that	 fairness	requires	patience,	and	that	 it	 is	 fair	to	 prefer	 settling	 a	 dispute	 through	words	 to	 doing	 so	 through	 deeds.	The	 former	 may	 be	 regarded	 as	 an	 echo	 of	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics,	1138a	 1–2,	 although	 the	 three	 topics	 in	 the	 Rhetoric	 follow	 an	 order	from	the	most	general	to	the	most	specific,	and	being	patient	does	not	in	itself	contain	any	reference	to	litigation.	The	 opposition	 of	 words	 and	 deeds	 is	 widespread	 in	 Greek	literature	and	the	variety	of	contexts	in	which	it	appears	does	not	allow	for	attributing	one	single	meaning	to	it.	What	seems	the	most	likely	here	is	that,	as	mentioned	above,	the	three	topics	start	with	a	general	attitude	(patience)	 and	 finish	with	 the	 choice	 between	 arbitration	 and	 judicial	decision-making.	 Hence,	 one	may	 reconstruct	 the	 three	 steps	 as	 three	choices	between	 (1)	being	patient	and	 trying	 to	 retaliate;	 (2)	 trying	 to																																									 																					19	A	striking	parallel	for	this	usage	of	epieikeia	can	be	found	in	the	treatise	On	
types	 of	 style	 (Peri	 ideōn,	 2.6)	 attributed	 to	 the	 2nd-century	 (AD)	 rhetorician	Hermogenes	of	Tarsus.	For	an	English	translation	see	Wooten	(1987).	
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332	settle	the	dispute	through	arguments	(which	includes	the	possibility	of	a	legal	 debate)	 and	 physical	 retaliation;	 (3)	 settling	 the	 dispute	 through	arbitration	and	taking	the	issue	to	court.	The	 third	 topic	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 brief	 explanation	concerning	the	nature	of	arbitration,	according	to	which	its	raison	d’être	is	 that	 unlike	 judges,	 arbitrators	 base	 their	 decisions	 upon	 fairness	rather	 than	 the	 laws.	While	 this	 opposition	may	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	courts	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 take	 to	 epieikes	 into	 consideration,	 which	would	 contradict	 both	 what	 Aristotle	 says	 in	 the	 Rhetoric	 and	 the	
Nicomachean	Ethics,20	and	contemporary	judicial	practice	(see	Roebuck,	2001,	p.	182;	Harris,	2013a,	p.	34;	pace	Meyer-Laurin,	1961,	p.	41),	it	is	in	fact	the	arbitrators	who	are	in	the	focus	here	and	Aristotle	seems	to	mean	 only	 that	 they	 do	 not	 have	 to	 provide	 an	 explanation	 that	 is	supported	(exclusively)	by	an	interpretation	of	the	written	law.21		6.	CONCLUSION		Having	 accepted	 an	 argument	 from	 fairness,	 the	 judges	 have	 to	“supplement”	 the	 text	 of	 the	 law	 interpreted,	 thereby	 making	 it	irrelevant	 for	 judging	 the	 action	 under	 dispute.	 The	 intention	 of	 the	legislator	 is	 thus	 referred	 to	 in	order	 to	make	 it	 clear	 that	 it	would	be	contrary	to	this	intention	to	punish	the	defendant	for	having	committed	the	crime	he	is	charged	with	(cf.	Harris,	2013a,	p.	31).	In	this	sense,	we	may	agree	with	 Jacques	Brunschwig,	who	argues	 that	 the	phrase	used	by	 Aristotle	 in	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics	 (“what	 the	 lawgiver	 would	himself	have	said	had	he	been	present,	and	would	have	included	within	the	 law,	had	he	known”)	 refers	 to	 two	different	 things.	 Supplementing	the	text	by	adding	further	qualification	of	the	action	in	terms	of	facts	or	intention	is	done	by	reconstructing	the	abstract	and	general	will	of	the	legislator,	while	deciding	that	the	rule	thus	obtained	is	not	relevant	for	the	facts	of	the	case	is	“what	the	lawgiver	would	himself	have	said	had	he	been	present.”	Yet	these	are	two	consecutive	steps	of	the	same	line	of	reasoning:	 the	 teleological	 or	 consequentialist	 part	 of	 the	 argument,	which	leads	to	the	decision	not	to	apply	the	law	needs	the	backing	of	the																																									 																					20	See	Nicomachian	Ethics	1132a	4–32,	where	Aristotle	describes	 the	 judge	as	




333	interpretive	or	rule-based	part,	in	order	to	make	the	judges	feel	safe	in	deciding	the	case,	apparently	“according	to	the	laws	and	decrees	of	the	Athenian	 people.”	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Aristotle’s	 final	 clause	 “had	 he	known”	 highlights	 the	 interdependence	 of	 the	 two	 steps.	 It	 is	 on	 the	basis	of	 the	knowledge	of	 the	particular	circumstances	of	 the	case	and	pondering	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	 judgement	 that	 the	 judges	 can	decide	 where	 the	 text	 says	 less	 than	 what	 is	 necessary	 for	 a	 just	decision.	 Taking	 into	 account	 the	 particular	 situation	 and	 offering	 a	corresponding	interpretation	of	the	general	rule	of	decision,	the	topic	of	definition	can	serve	the	aims	of	fairness,	so	that	the	speaker	will	be	able,	once	again,	“to	make	clear	what	is	just.”	Unlike	 the	conceptual	approach	summarised	 in	 the	 first	part	of	the	paper,	 the	subsequent	 list	of	 topics	seems	 to	have	a	much	broader	scope,	which	does	not	in	every	case	fit	the	interpretive	method.	The	last	three	 topics,	 in	 particular,	 do	 not	 say	 anything	 about	 how	 the	 judges	should	decide.	Neither	the	importance	of	patience,	nor	the	opposition	of	words	and	deeds	can	be	used	as	an	argument	concerning	the	merits	of	the	 legal	 case.	 The	 remark	 attached	 to	 the	 last	 one,	where	 arbitration	and	 adjudication	 by	 the	 court	 are	 compared,	 may	 appear	 in	 an	arbitration	case	as	a	means	of	reminding	the	arbitrators	of	their	duty	to	make	a	fair	decision,	but	the	assertion	that	“it	is	fair	to	prefer	arbitration	to	adjudication”	cannot	really	contribute	 to	such	a	decision.	Therefore,	their	place	in	Aristotle’s	list	is	best	explained	if	one	does	not	read	them	as	 topics	 for	 arguments	 in	 the	 strict	 sense.	 Together	with	 some	of	 the	other	 items	of	 the	 list,	 they	seem	to	serve	as	 topics	of	characterisation	focusing	 on	 the	 ethos	 aspect	 of	 the	 speech	 rather	 than	 the	 logos	 (cf.	Harris,	 2013a,	 p.	 32).	What	 connects	 them	 to	 the	 other,	 “legal”	 topics	and	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 of	what	 is	 to	 epieikes	 in	 law	 is	 that	 they	likewise	 stem	 from	 Aristotle’s	 definition	 of	 fairness	 and	 represent	popular	beliefs	of	morality.	One	 should	not,	however,	 look	 in	 them	 for	principles	 of	 legal	 interpretation,	 nor	 can	 they	 be	 used	 to	 reconstruct	Aristotle’s	 views	 on	 the	 functioning	 of	 epieikeia	 in	 judicial	 decision-making.			ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:	A	previous	version	of	the	first	part	of	the	paper	was	presented	at	the	2nd	Central	and	Eastern	European	Forum	of	Young	Legal,	 Political	 and	 Social	 Theorists,	 Budapest	 2010.	 As	 for	 its	 more	recent	readers,	I	am	grateful	to	Edward	Harris,	George	Boys-Stones,	and	Péter	 Cserne	 for	 their	 comments	 and	 advice.	 I	 am	 also	 indebted	 to	Serena	Tomasi	for	her	stimulating	response	at	the	conference.			
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serena.tomasi_1@unitn.it			1.	INTRODUCTION			Könczöl’s	 essay	 is	 a	 critical	 study	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 fairness	 from	 a	rhetorical	perspective	in	legal	argumentation.	In	my	view,	this	paper	has	two	main	features	(which	correspond	to	the	author’s	declared	aims):	i)	a	 philological	 interest	 since	 the	 author	 presents	 an	 accurate	reconstruction	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 fairness	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 classical	sources.	The	analysis	focuses	on	Aristotle,	taking	into	account	the	most	relevant	passages	 in	the	Rhetoric	and	 in	the	Nicomachean	Ethics.	Then,	the	Aristotelian	version	of	epieikeia	is	compared	to	the	one	proposed	by	Plato	 in	 the	 Statesman.	 ii)	 A	 rhetorical	 approach:	 the	 author	 lists	 a	possible	topic	of	arguments	based	on	fairness	that	is	useful	and	used	in	judicial	speeches.	In	this	comment,	I	argue	that	these	points	should	imply	further	theoretical	 and	 methodological	 insights,	 which	 are	 relevant	 in	 the	contemporary	 developments	 of	 legal	 theory	 and	 legal	 reasoning.	 My	goal	 is	 to	 recast	 the	 outcomes	 of	 Könczöl’s	 analysis	 in	 a	 broader	dimension	 linked	 to	 the	 debate	 in	 legal	 theory,	 by	 evaluating	 the	relation	 between	 positive	 law	 and	 fairness	 in	 light	 of	 argumentation	theory	 and	 by	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 argumentative	 process	 of	fairness	in	legal	reasoning.			2.	MULTIPLE	WORDS	FOR	EPIEIKEIA		The	classical	concept	of	epieikeia	has	played	a	key	role	in	legal	systems	for	ages,	since	Roman	lawyers	were	aware	of	the	inseparability	between	












340	 too	the	decree	is	adapted	to	the	facts	(Aristotle,	Nicomachean	Ethics,	bk	V,	ch.	10).		Out	 of	 metaphors,	 fairness	 consists	 in	 a	 fair	 trail	 in	 which	 the	interpretation	of	the	legal	provision	is	argued	by	the	parties	and,	finally,	by	the	judge.	Before	an	impartial	judge,	parties	must	set	their	positions,	demonstrate	 the	 soundness	 and	 the	 coherence,	 resist	 to	 objections,	persuade	each	other’s.	Claiming	trial,	conflicting	parties	make	a	shared	decision	 about	 their	 conflict	 by	 communicating	 about	 their	 different	standpoints,	trying	to	understand	each	other’s	reasons	and	arguing	each	other	 in	 an	 institutionalized	 framework.	 The	 third	 party,	 without	expressing	 a	 personal	 option,	would	 play	 a	mediating	 role	 to	 help	 the	parties	 to	 solve	 the	 conflict	 in	 a	 reasonable	 way,	 favoring	 the	 setting	(Greco	 Morasso,	 2011).	 During	 the	 communicative	 interaction,	 if	 the	parties	 pursue	 the	 same	 goal	 towards	 a	 reasonable	 solution	 of	 the	problem,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 debate	 the	 parties	 should	 show	 mutual	understanding	and	respect	the	final	decision.	To	my	mind,	 the	 argumentative	 account	 squares	perfectly	well	with	 the	 classical	 concept	 of	 fairness	 reconstructed	 by	 the	 Author,	demanding	 for	 the	 application	 in	 the	 legal	 context	 of	 argumentative	techniques	for	analysis	and	evaluation	of	arguments	(Feteris,	1999).			REFERENCES		Aristotle	(Ross,	W.D.	trans.)	(1908).	The	Nichomachean	Ethics.	Oxford:	Claredon	Press.	Canale,	 D.,	 &	 Tuzet,	 G.	 (2008),	 Interpretation	 and	 legal	 theory:	 a	 debate.	 In	
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